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 Abstract 
 
 
WORLD VIEW, METAPHYSICS, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
William W. Cobern, Arizona State University West 
 
It has been argued from world view theory that fundamental beliefs about the 
world exert a powerful influence on how sense is made of events in the world. 
However, the nature of that influence has remained enigmatic. Hannah 
Arendt's distinction between thinking and comprehension, and knowing and 
apprehension provides a clarification. Thinking is the epistemological path to 
conceptual comprehension. Knowing is the metaphysical path to apprehension 
- to the acceptance of a concept as true or valid. Comprehension does not 
necessitate apprehension. One may reject a fully understood concept. The 
recent discussion in science education about world view is essentially a 
discussion about metaphysics. The importance to educational practice is this. 
Science educators are often at a loss to understand why some students fail to 
develop orthodox scientific conceptions even after the best of instruction. The 
argument from world view is that in some cases, it is not that the students fail 
to understand what is being taught (comprehension). They simply do not 
believe (apprehension). There are, thus, occasions when the careful 
epistemological explication of a concept is not sufficient to bring about 
learning. Instruction must also include a discussion of the metaphysical 
foundations that support epistemology. 
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Introduction 
 In other papers on world view theory (1991; 1993; in press), I have argued the importance of 
fundamental beliefs with respect to learning science and the development of scientific attitudes. The 
argument is both intuitively and rationally strong that fundamental beliefs about the world exert a powerful 
influence on how sense is made of events in the world. However, the nature of that influence has remained 
enigmatic, thus limiting the application of world view theory to educational practice. Hannah Arendt's (1978) 
distinction between thinking and comprehension, on the one hand, and knowing and apprehension on the 
other, provides the basis of a possible clarification. In this presentation, I will briefly discuss how the linkage 
between world view (the level of metaphysics) and conceptual change (the level of epistemology) can be 
developed from Arendt's work on metaphysics and epistemology. I am not so naive as to think that this will 
settle the linkage issue once and for all. I claim only to be making a thoughtful contribution to the 
discussion. 
The Problem 
 The 1991 NARST monograph on world view theory (Cobern, 1991) provided a much needed 
clarification of the concept of world view. The monograph contributed to the discussion on how culture 
relates to science learning (e.g., Gallard, 1992). It provided a theoretical framework from which 
researchers can derive questions for study (Cobern, in press; Lassiter, 1992). The monograph, however, 
did not offer an adequate explication of the linkage between world view and conceptual change. 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a general relationship between world view and conceptual levels of 
thought (Figures 1-3 are from the monograph). Figure 1 is Gowen's Knowledge Vee which Novak has 
successfully used to show that epistemology has levels, the most general of which is world view. The 
purpose of Figure 2 is to emphasize the role world view has as a foundation for epistemology, whether it is 
the epistemology of informal commonsense or of formal scientific thinking. Figure 3 is an attempt to show 
more specifically the relationship between the alternative conceptions and misconceptions of science, and 
world view. The thrust is that a scientifically invalid conception can be valid on other grounds. The critical 
factor is how one chooses to make sense of the world. But, the question remains, "what do the lines 
connecting world view with the conceptual level of thought actually mean?" Moreover, and since research is 
supposed to support the improvement of science education (Yeany, 1992), what can this vague connection 
mean for the classroom practitioner? Seeking to offer further clarification, I borrowed Berger's (1979) 
notion of "plausibility structure," that is, a world view is what makes things plausible to a person (see 
Cobern, 1991, pp. 113-116). However, this too is an insufficiently answer. After all, what does it mean - in 
practical terms - to make something plausible? We must know more about the nature of the working 
relationship between world view and scientific knowledge (or for that matter, any knowledge) if we are to 
realize the full potential of world view theory. 
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The Solution 
 Science educators have long assumed that the case for the importance and validity of scientific 
knowledge was prima facie. This assumption rested on the philosophy of logical positivism which essentially 
claimed that only scientific knowledge was true knowledge. Smolicz & Nunan (1975) refered to this as the 
mythology of school science. Nevertheless, virtually all science teachers have had the unsettling experience 
of explaining a scientific concept with great care and skill only to have a student dismiss the concept 
virtually out of hand. At best, the positivist science teacher reacted by saying there must be yet a better 
way to teach the concept. At worst, the teacher assumed the student was either very foolish or had been 
indoctrinated by purveyors of anti-science. After all, the teacher is presenting
Page 4 of 10 
Page 5 of 10 
Page 6 of 10 
scientific facts. The community of science educators is now painfully aware of how very few laypeople 
ever accepted the positivistic faith. 
 In recent years, constructivist thought has elbowed aside positivism. A consistent constructivist 
teacher cannot react in the same way to the recalcitrant learner. The constructivist teacher knows that all 
knowledge entails ambiguity. There are no unambiguous facts. There are no determined theories. So, if 
scientific concepts do not have an inherent certainty, the consistent constructivist must eventually ask what 
are the principles on which validity or truth is decided. Some constructivists eschew metaphysical questions 
(von Glasersfeld, 1989). In doing so they show themselves to be trivial constructivists because they do not 
follow the constructivist argument to its natural conclusion - why do we believe what we do? Constructivism 
has resurrected the ancient idea that knowledge is valid or true belief, and it is with this idea that we can 
begin to understand how world view directly influences conceptual development and change. 
 Hannah Arendt (1978) noted that an argument can be rationally flawless. The interpretation of data 
can be epistemologically perfect. And yet, some will reject the conclusions. The reason, she argued, is the 
fundamental difference between thinking and knowing (see Figure 4). Thinking is necessary for knowledge, 
but not sufficient. Thinking is the epistemological process by which one comes to conceptual 
comprehension. Knowing is the metaphysical process by which one comes to apprehend, that is to accept 
as true or valid, that concept one has come to comprehend. However, comprehension does to necessitate 
apprehension. One may well reject a concept that is fully understood. Moreover, in many situations the 
metaphysical process occurs reflexively. In philosophy, metaphysical debate has long been out of fashion, 
but in education, the recent discussion about world view is essentially a discussion about metaphysics. 
 Science educators need not be at a loss to understand why some students fail to develop orthodox 
scientific conceptions even after the best of instruction. The argument from world view is that in some 
cases, it is not that the students fail to comprehend what is being taught - it is that they simply do not 
believe it. Therefore, there are occasions when the careful epistemological explication of a concept is not 
sufficient to bring about learning. The instruction must also include a discussion of the metaphysical 
foundations that support the epistemology. 
Significance 
 Once again scientific literacy is at the forefront of national discussions on education. Project 2061 
is about scientific literacy. It and other reform movements are a response to international studies showing 
science education in the USA lagging behind other countries. However, as Olson recently noted,
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 those studies are not measuring literacy - they are measuring retention of pieces of scientific 
information whose utility is questionable. What we have to ask... is what we mean by literacy? 
[Rather], scientific literacy must mean the same as literacy itself: getting around in the world, 
making meaning, and deciding how to act. The science you learn has to work in situations of 
ambiguity, value conflict, change, corporate 
 manipulation, and distraction. It is a tough world out there as they say. (1992, p. 7) 
Olson is supported by a recent study showing that after completing several college science courses, many 
of the students still had not integrated scientific knowledge into their views of what the natural world is really 
like (Cobern, in press). 
 An adequate theory of world view gets one beyond simplistic views of scientific literacy. It gets the 
profession beyond the bureaucratic and social engineering ethos that says successful science teaching is 
a matter of having the right techniques. Technique can show an argument to be reasonable. It cannot 
convince anyone that the conclusion is plausible or meaningful. I concur with Lythcott (1991, p. 47, 
emphasis added), "In negotiating meaning a science teacher weights the conversation toward listening to 
the learners and enabling them to find their voices." As of now we have only poorly formed ideas of what 
these issues of world view and metaphysics mean for classroom practice. However, the theoretical work 
implies that for the majority of students, if they are not allowed to do metaphysics there appears to be little 
chance that long term conceptual change will take place. Students will learn for the exam, but in the long 
run they will revert to what makes sense to them - which, as we know, is not science. 
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